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Abstract
People give feedback in conversation: both positive signals of understanding, such as nods, and
negative signals of misunderstanding, such as frowns. How do signals of understanding and
misunderstanding affect the coordination of language use in conversation? Using a chat tool and a
maze-based reference task, we test two experimental manipulations that selectively interfere with
feedback in live conversation: (a) “Attenuation” that replaces positive signals of understanding
such as “right” or “okay” with weaker, more provisional signals such as “errr” or “umm” and (2)
“Amplification” that replaces relatively specific signals of misunderstanding from clarification
requests such as “on the left?” with generic signals of trouble such as “huh?” or “eh?”. The results
show that Amplification promotes rapid convergence on more systematic, abstract ways of
describing maze locations while Attenuation has no significant effect. We interpret this as evi-
dence that “running repairs”—the processes of dealing with misunderstandings on the fly—are key
drivers of semantic coordination in dialogue. This suggests a new direction for experimental work
on conversation and a productive way to connect the empirical accounts of Conversation Analysis
with the representational and processing concerns of Formal Semantics and Psycholinguistics.
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1. Introduction
People do not use the same words in the same way. Differences in life history, cultural
background, individual physiology, and social communities can all contribute to differ-
ences in people’s language use (Clark, 1998). This apparently simple observation has sig-
nificant consequences. It raises foundational questions about what it means to say that
two people speak the same language or mean the same thing. It also raises practical ques-
tions. How can people communicate if there really are widespread individual differences
in language use? This paper engages with these issues through an experimental investiga-
tion of how different kinds of feedback contribute to the coordination of language use in
conversation. More specifically, we investigate what signals of understanding and misun-
derstanding contribute to people’s ability to coordinate their descriptions of locations in a
simple schematic maze (Anderson & Garrod, 1987).
The results provide evidence that natural signals of understanding and misunder-
standing have systematically different effects on the kind of language people use to
describe where they are in the maze. Signals of misunderstanding, in particular, appear
to have a special role in coordinating changes to the semantics of maze location
descriptions. We interpret this finding as providing support for a general Running
Repairs Hypothesis: coordination of language use depends primarily on processes used
to deal with misunderstanding on the fly and only secondarily on those associated
with signaling understanding. The basic intuition behind this hypothesis is that differ-
ences between different people’s patterns of language use are more efficiently dealt
with by identifying and dealing with specific local points of difference (i.e., misunder-
standings) than by confirming apparent points of commonality (i.e., understanding).
Public signals of misunderstanding can provide joint constraints that are useful for
driving a progressive narrowing down of possible interpretations. Public signals of
understanding, by contrast, primarily provide confirmation of existing interpretations
rather than specific momentum for change and are probably most useful after people
have converged by other means.
The Running Repairs Hypothesis is directly inspired by the Conversation Analytic
(CA) account of repair: the procedures whereby people detect and deal with difficul-
ties with mutual understanding (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974a; Schegloff, 1987,
1995). It is an explicit attempt to connect CA insights about repair with the represen-
tational and processing concerns of the cognitive sciences. The potential interest of
this connection for cognitive scientists depends partly on whether formal and computa-
tional models can be developed that provide convincing repair-driven accounts of
semantic coordination (see Ginzburg, 2012; Eshghi, Howes, Hough, Gregoromichelaki,
& Purver, 2015; Howes & Eshghi, 2017; and also Ginzburg & Kolliaku, 2018; Lars-
son, 2018, this volume). It also depends on providing experimental evidence of causal
connections between repair processes and specific patterns of language use in conver-
sation.
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2. Coordinating language use
It is useful to distinguish two broad psycholinguistic approaches to conversation that
we gloss here as Aggregate and Interactional. This is not an individual vs. social distinc-
tion; both approaches aim to explain coordinated language processing in conversation. It
is also unlikely that any psycholinguistic model of conversation falls exclusively into only
one of these categories; the distinction is introduced primarily to help clarify what is at
issue.
Aggregate approaches emphasize the use of established models of individual language
processing as a way of accounting for dialogue. They use the same basic cognitive mech-
anisms that explain individual lexical, syntactic, and semantic processing and then model
dialogue as aggregations of those mechanisms acting in concert (Barr & Keysar, 2002;
Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006).
The key advantage of this general approach is simplicity as it builds on relatively well-
understood mechanisms that have been extensively tested experimentally. Aggregate mod-
els have been used, among other things, to explain patterns of language coordination in
the Maze Task (see discussion below and also, for example, Garrod & Doherty, 1994;
Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
In contrast to this, Interactional approaches propose that dialogue presents processing
challenges that are qualitatively different from individual language processing and require
different mechanisms to explain them (Bavelas, 2007; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Eshghi &
Healey, 2016; Goodwin, 1979; Healey, 2008; Schober & Brennan, 2003).
The processes most commonly emphasized in Interactional accounts are the forms of
interactive feedback that people provide to each other during conversation. For example,
addressees normally provide ongoing evidence of how well they are following a speaker’s
turn by producing concurrent, carefully timed, and contextually appropriate signals of
understanding using gaze, facial expressions, and backchannels such as nods, “yeah”s, and
“aha”s (e.g., Bavelas et al., 2000; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Yngve, 1970). Alterna-
tively, if addressees encounter problems in interpreting a speaker’s ongoing turn, they typi-
cally produce concurrent signals of misunderstanding such as raised eyebrows, puzzled
looks, or overt clarification questions such as “eh?” and “sorry?” (Dingemanse, Torreira,
& Enfield, 2013; Drew, 1997; Purver, Ginzburg & Healey, 2003).
This kind of structured conversational feedback is characteristic of natural conversation
in almost any context (Bavelas et al., 2000; Clark, 1996; Colman & Healey, 2011; Dinge-
manse et al., 2013; Kendrick, 2015; Schegloff, 1993) but largely absent from language in
other contexts of use, such as speeches or narration, and rarely encountered in standard
psycholinguistic laboratory tasks.
By default Aggregate accounts idealize to cases in which processes of language pro-
duction and comprehension do not diverge in significant ways between different people; a
consequence of the claim that both inter-individual processing and intra-individual pro-
cessing can be modeled using the same lexical, syntactic, semantic, and contextual repre-
sentations, and the same processing mechanisms (Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006, 2013).
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However, this makes accounting for structured conversational feedback phenomena
problematic.
If this idealization is satisfied, it is unclear why people should provide frequent ongoing
evidence of understanding in conversation. By hypothesis, intra- and inter-person language
processing use the same mechanisms, so differences in the form or frequency of feedback
have to be explained as somehow epiphenomenal or auxiliary to normal language process-
ing. Where this idealization is not satisfied because of misunderstandings due to mis-
matches in language use, the primary Aggregate mechanisms of coordination are poorly
equipped to deal with them (e.g., automatic mutual priming in Pickering and Garrod
[2004, 2006] or rapid “efferent copy” predictions that shadow production and comprehen-
sion in Pickering and Garrod [2013]). Instead, alternative Interactional processes for
detecting and repairing problems are needed and are often cited as auxiliary mechanisms.
In contrast to this, the Running Repairs Hypothesis treats interactive feedback as cen-
tral to language processing in conversation, a position closely associated with Clark’s
grounding model of dialogue (Clark, 1996). It further proposes that the specific forms of
interactive feedback associated with misunderstanding have a special status in explaining
the form of language coordination that emerges in conversation; that is, that misunder-
standings are the primary drivers of changes in the form of semantic coordination that
develops through interaction (Healey, 1997, 2008; Mills, 2013).
We explore these claims through experiments on referring expressions in the Maze
Task. These experiments provide a direct test of the causal effects of feedback on coordi-
nation by selectively interfering with these mechanisms during live text–chat conversa-
tions. They also provide a direct contrast of the contribution of positive evidence of
understanding such as “yeah” and “aha” with negative evidence of misunderstanding such
as “wot?” and “sorry?” to language coordination in conversation.
3. Language coordination experiments
The most common paradigm in psycholinguistic experiments on dialogue involves
investigation of how people coordinate their use of referring expressions. In these tasks,
people try to describe something—typically an object, figure, or location—in a way that
allows their conversational partner to pick the same thing out from a set of alternatives
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Krauss
& Weinheimer, 1966; Metzing & Brennan, 2003).
The recurrent finding in these experiments is that the form of referring expressions
people produce systematically changes over time. What processes drive this change?
Aggregate accounts argue that they are best explained in terms of mechanisms such as
recent activation of a word or syntactic structure, general linguistic precedent, or memory
constraints (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).
Interactional accounts claim that structured feedback processes, and specific histories of
their use in specific interactions, play an essential role (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Schober & Clark, 1989).
370 P. G. T. Healey et al. / Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2018)
The best known Interactional account of these processes is the collaborative model of
grounding (Clark, 1996; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Schober & Clark, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986). The collaborative model emphasizes the role of positive feedback. In order
for a speaker’s referring expression to be accepted as common usage in a conversation,
addressees must provide appropriate evidence that it has been heard and understood. On the
assumption that people seek to minimize the joint effort needed to communicate, this pro-
vides an account of how referring expressions can become highly abbreviated over repeated
references to an object. Importantly, this pattern of change in referring expressions is sensi-
tive to the provision of appropriate feedback from specific conversational partners (Schober
& Clark, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Eshghi & Healey, 2016).
When a referring expression fails, positive evidence, or its absence, is of limited use
because it provides few constraints on how people should revise what they said to help
their partner understand it. Without any other information, a speaker is left with trying
successive alternative referring expressions until they find something that works (c.f.
Lewis’s [1969] analysis of coordination of linguistic conventions). In effect, coordination
is modeled as a problem of an individual selecting from an existing repertoire of ways of
referring to things or inventing a new referring expression in the hope that they can uni-
laterally identify a scheme that also works for collaboration with their partner.
The Running Repairs Hypothesis proposes that the bilateral processes of signaling and
resolving misunderstandings are key to people’s ability to build new conventions or “sub-
languages” on-the-fly in task-oriented dialogues (Healey, 1997, 2008; Healey, Swoboda,
Umata, & King, 2007; Mills, 2013). Negative evidence provides people with specific new
information about differences in language use which provide a more fine-grained, cross-
speaker basis for revising their referring expressions than positive evidence can. We apply
this argument in the context of coordination of language use in the Maze task.
4. The Maze Task
The Maze Task was devised by Garrod and Anderson (Anderson & Garrod, 1987;
Garrod & Anderson, 1987) as an interactive game in which pairs of people collaborate to
navigate through a maze to reach a goal point (Fig. 1). They cannot see each other’s
positions in the maze and in order to reach their respective goals they must describe to
each other where switch points are that open and close gates in each other’s mazes. As a
result, they repeatedly exchange location descriptions. Importantly the configuration of
the Maze changes over trials and this pushes participants toward developing systematic
approaches to describing sequences of different locations in sequences of different mazes.
The referring expressions people produce to describe locations in this task can be reli-
ably classified into four general classes; Figural, Path, Line, and Matrix (Anderson &
Garrod, 1987; Garrod & Anderson, 1987). They are coded into these categories according
to the surface form of the location descriptions, including choice of words (e.g. “box” vs.
“row”), use of counting systems (none vs. ordinal vs. cardinal), and the procedure they
use to locate a particular position (landmark based, path based, line based, or coordinate
P. G. T. Healey et al. / Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2018) 371
based). We illustrate each description type with examples drawn from the text chat exper-
imental corpus described below.
Figural and Path descriptions both rely on the specific configuration of boxes and links
in each instance of the maze. Figural descriptions make use of salient landmarks or
shapes in a maze as a way to identify target locations as in or near a landmark, for exam-
ple, “A: u kno the box on the right hand side the 1 that has no neigbours” or “A: u know
the L shape is the first box of that.” Path descriptions are similarly sensitive to the config-
uration of each maze and often use a landmark to identify where to start from but are dis-
tinguished by also, using a move by move route that can be followed through the
particular configuration of boxes and links to a target location, for example, “A: go left
twice and down twice.”
Line and Matrix descriptions, by contrast, have a more systematic organization. In Line
descriptions this involves an ordered row or column elements with target locations identi-
fied as boxes inside these elements. For example “A: my 1st switch is on the 2nd row,
2nd from the right” or “A: my x is at the 7th column and bottom square.” In the case of
Matrix descriptions, the maze is treated as an array of boxes with locations specified,
using Cartesian coordinates, for example, “A: am on 2,7, dest is 4,3.” Both these schemes
involve systematic enumeration of elements with ordinal counting in the case of Line
descriptions and cardinal in the case of Matrix.
4.1 Semantic coordination in the Maze Task
In addition to differences in their form, Healey (2008) proposes that the different maze
description schemes are also associated with different semantic models. The Figural
descriptions involve a relatively ad hoc ontology of salient landmarks or groupings that
Fig. 1. Pair of maze configurations. vertical black bars = gates, gray squares = switch points.
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does not systematically generalize across mazes. Path descriptions also depend on the
specific configuration of a particular maze. For example, “gaps” are not used as part of a
path, although the concept of a stepwise pathway does generalize across mazes. The lim-
ited systematicity of these two description types is illustrated by way of what is ostensi-
bly the same location on two different mazes rarely receives the same Figural or Path
description. In contrast to this, Line and Matrix description schemes involve more
abstract ontologies of possible locations. In a Line description, locations are organized
into an ordered set of rows or columns which can be applied in the same way to all
instances of the maze. In the case of Matrix descriptions, the ontology is even more uni-
form with locations organized as a simple grid-like array with two axes. These more sys-
tematic structures generalize to all instances of the maze and are sufficiently abstract that
missing boxes or gaps in the maze are still enumerated when a description is produced.
In this case, the same location on any two mazes is normally associated with the same
form of Line or Matrix description.1 Healey (2008) draws on these observations to pro-
pose a basic semantic ordering on the description types: Figural, Path, Line, Matrix,
which goes from the relatively concrete, instance-specific forms to the more abstract,
systematic, and generalizable forms.
4.2 Coordinating language use in the Maze Task
The standard pattern of coordination observed in the Maze Task is that people migrate
from using Figural and Path descriptions in early trials toward more abstract Line and
Matrix descriptions in later trials (Garrod & Anderson, 1987). This pattern is illustrated
by the sequence of descriptions in Table 1.
What drives this shift in referring expressions over time? Previous work has shown
that it is not, in general, achieved by explicit negotiation; for example not by stating that
the maze is a grid with numbers down the side and letters across the bottom (Garrod &
Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Healey, 1997). People do sometimes attempt
to coordinate using explicit negotiation, but it usually fails and people often violate what-
ever approach they have just explicitly agreed on. In general, this approach appears to be
Table 1
Example evolution of Maze Task referring expressions
0 min The sticking out piece on top of the maze
2 min Left hand corner of the maze
5 min The northernmost box
10 min Topmost square of the column on top
15 min 3rd column middle square
20 min 3rd column first square
25 min 6th row longest column
30 min 6th row 1st column
40 min 6 r 1 c
45 min 6,1
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of most use once people have already coordinated on a basic semantic model for the
maze and is more commonly observed in later trials on the task where people have
already built up some coordination (Healey, 1997).
In lieu of explicit negotiation, explanations of coordination in the Maze Task, such as
Input-Output Coordination (Garrod & Anderson, 1987) and Interactive Alignment (Pick-
ering & Garrod, 2004, 2007), have proposed Aggregate mechanisms of coordination. At
any particular point in the conversation, the activation of representations involved in com-
prehending a description of a given type makes the production of a new description of
the same type much more likely. So if one person produces, say, a Path description of a
location, this will also activate the lexical, syntactic and semantic representations associ-
ated with those descriptions for the addressee who hears it. When they subsequently pro-
duce a description of another location, these representations are already active and this
facilitates the production of a new Path style description. In this way, language
processing becomes entrained across participants.
A problem for this kind of explanation is that it doesn’t predict the pattern of migration
captured in Table 1. People initially have most success in this task with the Figural and Path
descriptions and statistically these will be most strongly activated; nevertheless, as noted,
people consistently migrate away from these toward Line and Matrix description types (Gar-
rod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Healey, 1997). This trend is counter to
what is predicted by priming, precedent, or recency effects alone. A second difficulty is that
this picture of coordination is too passive. At the start of the Maze Task people often differ
on the meaning of even relatively simple words like “box” or “row” in the context of the
maze. Healey (1997) found that around 65% of people’s initial referring expressions in the
Maze Task are subject to some form of explicit clarification request. These overt, active
clarification and repair processes seem, by definition, to require an Interactional explanation.
A third issue is that Aggregate accounts presuppose that the lexical, syntactic, and semantic
resources needed to produce or comprehend each scheme are in some sense already avail-
able to participants. The coordination problem is modeled primarily as a matter of ensuring
the same scheme is activated. However, there is evidence that the solutions to the coordina-
tion problems which people develop in this task are, to a significant degree, novel conven-
tions that emerge from the interaction. For example, there is evidence that novel and
semantically distinct task sub-languages emerge by default in different groups who perform
the task separately (Healey, 1997, 2008).
4.3 Hypotheses
To summarize, the Running Repairs Hypothesis combines the claim that interactive
feedback is central to the coordination of language use in conversation with the claim that
negative feedback plays an especially critical role in coordinated language use by
underpinning coordinated semantic change. This leads to two basic experimental
hypotheses about the patterns of language use and language change observed in the Maze
Task:
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H1: Positive evidence of understanding promotes re-use of existing maze referring
schemes.
H2: Negative evidence of understanding promotes evolution of new maze referring
schemes.
We test these two hypotheses by selectively manipulating the kinds of feedback people
appear to receive from each other. We use two manipulations which we label “Attenua-
tion” and “Amplification.” The first tests H1 by reducing the degree of positive evidence a
person receives in response to a location description. The second tests H2 by increasing the
strength of the negative evidence someone receives by replacing a relatively precise clarifi-
cation question with a less specific or “stronger” repair initiation that signals a potentially
wider range of possible problems (Drew, 1997; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974).
5. Methods
The manipulations of live Maze Task dialogues were carried out using a customized
text chat tool (see Eshghi & Healey, 2016; Healey & Mills, 2006; Healey, Purver, King,
Ginzburg, & Mills, 2003; Howes, Purver, Healey, Mills, & Gregoromichelaki, 2011)
which enables substitutions of words in real-time interactions without participant’s knowl-
edge. The two experimental manipulations are run between-subjects with a third control
condition with no manipulations for comparison.
The use of text-chat enables experimental manipulations that are not possible with live
spoken interaction. However, this also raises questions about whether results with text-
chat generalize to other modalities. A full answer to this question requires comparison of
specific interactional phenomena in each case (an issue taken up the discussion below),
but the initial plausibility of this approach derives from the observation that many basic
conversational mechanisms, such as clarification questions and self-repairs, do naturally
occur in text-based interactions. Given the increasing important of text messaging as a
communication channel, even results that do not generalize beyond text–chat are
significant for theories of human communication.
5.1 Materials
5.1.1 The DiET chat tool
The experiments were conducted using a version of the Maze Task developed for the
DiET chat tool experimental platform. As each turn is typed, the DiET server monitors it
for target expressions, substitutes them with experimental probe expressions, and then
sends the modified turn to the other participant. Only the recipient of the turn sees the
substitution; the person who originally typed it does not. The list of target expressions
and substitutions is generated from previous text-chat experiments to ensure natural
text-chat usage is accommodated. This enables two experimental manipulations:
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1. Attenuation: Identify naturally produced positive feedback such as “Yes” and
“okay” and substitute with more provisional forms such as “erm,” “err,” “uurrm,”
while the rest of the turn is left unchanged. For example, an “Okay” becomes “Err”
and “Okay go to your goal now” becomes “Errr go to your goal now.”
2. Amplification: Identify naturally occurring reprise clarification requests that use a
verbatim repeat of a word or phrase from a partner’s preceding turn followed by a
question mark. For example, if A produces two successive turns: “A: I have two
switches—one of them is on the top left” and “A: the other switch is in the top right”
B might produce “top left?”, “top right?” or “top?” as reprise clarifications. These are
substituted for less specific open class clarifications such as “What?”, “Huh?” and
“Sorry?”
These manipulations preserve the basic structure of the turn sequence and leave the
content of location descriptions unchanged while manipulating the evidence of under-
standing people appear to provide to each other. One difference between spoken and text
conversation is that spoken questions like “What?” and “Sorry?” can be understood as
signaling that somebody did not hear what was said. This interpretation is less likely in
text-chat because turns persist.
Illustrative examples of these two manipulations drawn from the text chat corpus col-
lected in the experiments reported below are provided in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. These
excerpts show how participant’s interpretation of the manipulations depends on the imme-
diate conversational context.
5.2 Predictions
The DiET chat tool makes a variety of potential dependent variables available for anal-
ysis. We use three simple measures of task performance (c.f. Healey, 2008; Howes et al.,
2011). Number of Mazes completed within a fixed time (in this case 50 min) gives a
Table 2
Example Attenuation 1, Path description (manipulation in bold, substituted words in ‘[]’)
A Do u know where my position is?
B [yes] ? uuumm
A I know where u are
B U can only go left 2 or down left 1 down 1 ?
A Left 1 down 1
B Yes
Table 3
Example Attenuation 2, Figural description (manipulation in bold, substituted words in ‘[]’)
A Then im on the last box
B On the far right hand side?
A [ye] ? errrm
B All the way to the right i mean
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basic measure of global task performance. This is combined with two measures of task
process. First, total number of turns used per maze completed, with turn completion oper-
ationalized as the text sent on pressing the enter key. This gives a simple measure of
how much interaction is required to complete each maze. Second, typing speed in
characters (including spaces) per second between onset of the first character and pressing
enter. This provides a measure of how easy participants find it to formulate their turns,
the assumption being that people who are confident of how to describe their position or
what to do next will, all things being equal, type faster than those who are not (this
approach is also used in Howes et al., 2011).
For measures of semantic coordination we use three dependent variables to assess the
forms of referring expression used in turns that contain a location description. Following
the previous Maze Task literature, we use the content based hand coding of description
types: Figural, Path, Line, Matrix, following the classification described by Garrod and
Anderson (1987) (see description above). In addition to this we provide two automatically
coded measures. First, number of digits used in each location description that counts all
instances of < 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th,. . . > and < 1, 2, 3, 4,. . ., > in each turn (defined as
above) but ignores number words such as “one,” “two,” “three,” “four,” and ordinals such
as “first” and “last.” The rationale is that this provides a simple but fine-grained index of
participants’ assumptions about how well coordinated their ontology of locations is.
Roughly, if participants know what things to count and are doing it frequently enough to
use digits, this suggests a relatively stable concept of what a “possible location” is in the
maze and a relatively well-organized scheme (like the Line and Matrix schemes) for
Table 4
Example Amplification 1, Figural description (manipulation in bold, substituted words in ‘[]’)
A Ok i got it
A Am on it now
B [ur on the top right?] ? Sorry?
A On the shaded one
B Ok where is ur shaded one describe it
B Describe both quickly
A Its on the top
B Ok and the other one?. . .
A And one after the gate
B BRO WE DONT HAVE THE SAME GATES DIDNT U LISTNE?
Table 5
Example Amplification 2, Line description (manipulation in bold, substituted words in ‘[]’)
A Then where is your switch
B Come to 2nd one
B and tell me
A [2nd one what] ? srry what?
B I mean come to 2nd block of last column
B and stop there
A No its blocked here
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individuating them. The last measure is description length measured as the number of
characters (including spaces) in a turn containing a location description.
For example, “in the penultimate square on the left wing” is classified as a Figural
description that uses 0 digits and 42 characters; “1st col 2nd row” is classified as a Line
description containing 2 digits and 15 characters and “5,5” is a Matrix description using
2 digits and 3 characters.
Both interventions disrupt the dialogue and should therefore interfere with measures of
task performance predicting fewer mazes completed and more turns to complete each
maze. If the interventions make people unsure of what to say, this should, all things being
equal, also lead to people taking more time to construct their turns.
The most important predictions relate to use of referring expressions. Different refer-
ring expressions have different forms, different typical lengths, and also make different
use of enumeration (see illustration in Table 1). Enumeration is especially important
because it indexes degree of coordination on the basic semantic ontology needed to
underpin the more systematic semantic description schemes used by the Line and Matrix
descriptions (see above).
H1 predicts that Attenuation should slow down the shift in description types, slow the
increase in use of enumeration, and promote longer description types relative to controls.
H2 predicts that Amplification should accelerate the shift in description types, increase
enumeration, and shorten description types relative to controls.
5.3 Participants
Participants were recruited anonymously from undergraduate and postgraduate students
across a variety of disciplines using general mailing lists. A total of 88 participants were
recruited in three separate rounds. They were divided into 18 pairs in the control condi-
tion, 13 pairs in the Amplification condition, and 13 in the Attenuation condition.
5.4 Procedure
Pairs of subjects were booked in for 1 h slots. They were seated in separate experi-
mental cubicles and given written instructions explaining the task. Each pair was asked to
complete 12 pairs of mazes as quickly as possible. In the Attenuation condition three
pairs of participants were allowed to continue for longer than in the other two conditions.
To ensure comparability for the analysis we use only the data collected up to the first
50 min of each session. The experimental manipulations were not disclosed to the
participants until the debriefing session.
6. Results
The number of turns or mazes completed is not independent for the members of a
pair. To allow for this the relevant data is analysed as scores per pair. For the rest of
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the analyses pair is included as a random factor in order to allow for possible statisti-
cal dependencies between responses by the different members of a pair. Following
Healey and Mills (2006); Eshghi and Healey (2016) we pool the scores for the first
six Early and last six Late mazes to provide an index of task experience. This simpli-
fies the analysis and also reduces the variability contributed by individual mazes. To
accommodate the mix of repeated and between subjects measures and the different
distributions of the dependent variables, Generalized Linear Mixed Models procedure
in SPSS (v.21) was used for all statistical analyses other than simple non-parametric
comparisons.
All spoof turns produced by the DiET server are excluded from all analyses to avoid
biasing any of the typing measures; however, the original, unmodified turns are included
in turn counts. One pair from the amplification condition is also excluded as the transcript
indicated they had failed to understand the task. After these exclusions the three condi-
tions together yielded a total corpus of 13,744 turns. Using the criteria described above,
all turns were coded by the authors for whether they contained a location description
(Y/N) and the type of location description (Figural, Path, Line or Matrix). This coding
yielded a total of 2,844 location descriptions.
6.1 Task performance
Table 6 shows the average number of turns and mazes completed by each pair in the
first 50 min of the interactions.
6.1.1 Turns
Mann–Whitney’s U test shows no significant difference between the Attenuation and
Control conditions in number of turns taken per maze (U = 1.15, p = .25, N = 552) nor
between the Amplify and Control conditions (U = 0.76, p = .45, N = 557).
6.1.2 Mazes
Chi squared comparisons of the number of pairs who did or did not reach the last
Maze of the 12 within 50 min also showed no significant differences (Attenuation vs.
Control = Chi(1)2 = 1.41, p = .24; Amplification vs. Control Chi(1)2 = 0.54, p = .46.
However, because this is a measure of the pair’s performance the numbers in each cell
are small and the comparisons are low powered.
Table 6
Summary statistics
Averages Control Attenuate Amplify
Average number of turns per maze 34.2 37.4 34.2
Average number of mazes completed 9.5 7.2 8.2
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6.1.3 Typing speed
Inspection of the data showed some turns had typing speeds above 7 characters per
second (the level achieved by professional typists) these had been created by partici-
pants occasionally keeping a key continuously pressed. To filter these out, all turns
with speeds over 7 characters per second were excluded from the analysis. Partici-
pants’ average typing speed on each maze were analyzed in two GLMM Linear anal-
yses with Pair as a random factor and Stage (First 6 vs. Last 6), Condition
(Attenuation or Amplification vs. Control) and the Stage 9 Condition interaction as
fixed factors.
For Attenuation, there is no main effect of Condition (F(1,534) = 2.32, p = .13), a main
effect of Stage (F(1,534) = 38.6, p < .01), and no Condition 9 Stage Interaction
(F(1,534) = 0.03, p = .87). For Amplification there is also no main effect of Condition
(F(1,538) = 0.22, p = .64), a main effect of Stage (F(1,538) = 16.82, p < .01), and no
Condition 9 Stage Interaction (F(1,538) = 0.04, p = .85).
Table 7 illustrates the overall pattern for typing speed. Typing speed for all partici-
pants increases as the task progresses. Although the means suggest some impact of
Attenuation on typing speed, the effect is not statistically significant.
6.2. Language use
6.2.1 Description types
Comparison of the distribution of description types across conditions was made with
two multinomial regression analyses with Pair as a random factor and Stage (First 6 vs.
Last 6) and Condition (Attenuation or Amplification vs. Control) and the Stage 9 Condi-
tion interaction as fixed factors. Multinomial regression estimates the relative probabilities
of the distribution of description types and so differences in the total number of descrip-
tions at different stages do not affect the analysis.
Attenuation shows no main effect of Condition (F(4,108) = 1.13, p = .34), a main effect
of Stage (F(4,108) = 12.86, p < .01) and no Condition 9 Stage Interaction (F(4,108) = 0.45,
p = .77). Amplification shows both a main effect of Condition (F(4,108) = 8.75, p < .01)
and a main effect of Stage (F(4,108) = 20.3, p < .01) and no Condition 9 Stage
Interaction (F(4,108) = 0.45, p = .77).
Fig. 2 illustrates the pattern of results. The Control and Attenuation conditions follow
the typical pattern of migration from Figural and Path descriptions toward Line and
Matrix (see above) and are not reliably different from each other. Pairs in the
Table 7
Average typing speeds (Estimated Marginal Means)
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Amplification condition make the shift to abstract description types more strongly and
more quickly.
The counts of digits were positively skewed so a GLMM model with a Poisson
distribution was used to compare the frequency of digits in location descriptions
across conditions. As above, pair was included as a random factor, Stage and Condi-
tion (Attenuation or Amplification vs. Control) and the Stage 9 Condition interaction
as fixed factors.
Attenuation shows no main effect of Condition (F(1,2120) = 0.03, p = .87); a main
effect of Stage (F(1,2120) = 92.2, p < .01); and no interaction (F(1,2120) = 0.94,
p = .33). Amplification also shows no main effect of Condition (F(1,2013) = 0.03,
p = .23); a main effect of Stage (F(1,2013) = 102, p < .01); and in addition, a Stage 9
Condition interaction (F(1,2013) = 5.75, p = .02). The source of the interaction is pairs
in the Amplification condition, using reliably more digits in the last six mazes (Fixed
Coefficient = 0.24, t = 2.413, p = .02). The overall pattern of digit use is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
7. Discussion
The experimental manipulations do not have the predicted effects on task performance.
Although the means are suggestive, the number of mazes completed, the number of turns
Fig. 2. Pattern of use of location description types.
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used per maze, and the speed with which people construct their turns are not reliably differ-
ent across conditions. In general, we expect effects on task performance because differences
in people’s degree of linguistic coordination should ultimately translate to differences in
task performance. One possibility is that this assumption doesn’t hold for this task. People
might be able to use actions in the maze to compensate for difficulties with communica-
tion—for example, using moves in the maze to test their interpretation of a location descrip-
tion rather than questions. Another possibility is that 12 trials provide insufficient statistical
power for reliable effects on performance to emerge. A longer sequence of trials and possi-
bly a larger number of participants would be needed to test this possibility.
The effects on semantic coordination are more interesting. The reduction in positive
evidence does not reliably affect choice of description type. This failure to find an effect
does not directly falsify or support the hypothesis that positive evidence of understanding
promotes re-use of a referring expression (H1). It does, however, suggest that positive
feedback is not a critical mechanism driving changes in choice of location description
types.
Fig. 3. Use of enumeration in location descriptions (Error Bars show 95% C.I.).
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This result appears to conflict with previous findings that patterns of change in definite
referring expressions are directly affected by the availability and strength of positive feed-
back (Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Schober & Clark, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986;
Metzing & Brennan, 2003). The simplest potential explanation for this is that the experi-
mental intervention used here is not strong enough to uncover these effects, or there was
insufficient statistical power. The examples in Table 2 and 3 suggest that the Attenuation
intervention did not have a marked effect on the turn sequence.
A second possible explanation for the conflict with previous findings is the difference
between the Maze Task and the typical definite reference tasks. In tasks such as the Tan-
gram Task and its variants, people are required to coordinate repeated references to the
same specific items. In contrast to this, the Maze Task requires people to coordinate ref-
erences to a succession of different specific instances of items of a similar type,
sequences of locations. It is possible that positive evidence of understanding may be more
important to the collaborative processes of establishing a name for a recurring item, that
is, for the processes of contraction or abbreviation typically seen in the Tangram Task
(Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), than it is for developing gen-
eral referring schemes that work across non-repeating instances of a class of things that
is, the process of abstraction seen in the Maze Task (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Healey,
2008).
In contrast to this, the Amplification manipulation causes a strong and early shift to
more abstract description types. This supports the hypothesis that negative evidence plays
an important role in coordinating the evolution of maze referring schemes (H2). It shows,
in particular, that the effect on description types is mediated by differences between the
repair sequences that the original clarification questions would, counter-factually, have
prompted and the sequences that the experimental substitutions actually caused. Conver-
gence on more systematic and abstract semantic models of locations is facilitated by, in
effect, highlighting misunderstandings.
This finding also raises a question about the Running Repairs Hypothesis, which is
built on the intuition that negative evidence is useful because it provides localized, public
information about likely differences in language use that can be used to help people adapt
in response to problems with mutual intelligibility (Healey, 1997, 2008; Mills, 2013).
However, the Amplification manipulation used here strictly reduces the information avail-
able to participants; substitution of relatively specific clarification questions with “unre-
stricted” repair initiations like “what?” and “sorry?” should make it harder for an
addressee to localize or diagnose what aspects of a prior turn their partner has a problem
with (Sacks et al., 1974b). This is puzzling but our general proposal is that the effect of
the amplifications is to take a real problem encountered in the dialogue and then prompt
the participants to work harder to resolve it than they otherwise would. Some indication
of this can be seen in the excerpts in Tables 4 and 5 where the trajectory of the turn
sequence does appear to be substantially altered by the intervention. Although we cannot
be sure that they would not have happened anyway, it seems plausible that the elabora-
tions “on the shaded one” and “i mean come to 2nd block of last column” are prompted
by the intervention and that answers to the actual, substituted questions would have been
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different. These responses each provide useful additional information that would help par-
ticipants discover and hunt down possible differences in interpretation and, in doing so,
converge more rapidly (cf. Brennan & Schober, 2001).
These results establish a prima facie case for a direct causal connection between local
repair processes and the evolution of semantic conventions over the course of a conversa-
tion. To make this general line of explanation work requires, among other things, the
development of semantic models that can model such on-the-fly conceptual adaptations
on a turn-by-turn, and even word-by-word basis to capture the proposed process of
adjustment of interpretations. Although such a model does not yet exist, advances in
formal semantics suggest it is not out of reach (see, for example, Ginzburg & Kolliaku,
this issue; Larsson, this issue; also Eshghi et al. [2015]; Howes and Eshghi [2017] for a
semantic model of feedback that is compatible with the Running Repairs Hypothesis).
The results also suggest the potential for a productive new interface between Conversa-
tion Analysis, Formal Semantics, and Psycholinguistics. The detailed structure of repair
sequences is well understood (Schegloff, 1987, 1992; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks,
1977). However, their effects on semantic change have not previously been explored
experimentally. The fine-grained, real-time interventions made possible by the DiET chat
tool enable selective interference with different repair processes. This enables a form of
experimental conversation analysis that, we hope, can complement existing work by cau-
sally testing the effects of a variety of different interactional mechanisms on the subse-
quent trajectory of an interaction.
Some caveats are needed. One methodological issue with this approach is the use of
text-based interaction. Text chat in its various forms is now a common form of communi-
cation, but we know relatively little about how processes such as turn-taking and repair
in text-chat formats differ from spoken conversation (Scho€onfeldt & Golato, 2003).2 The
plausibility of the generalization made here is supported by the conversational style of
the Maze Task chat exchanges, including the natural production of simple grounding sig-
nals and repair phenomena on which the experimental manipulations depend. It is also
supported by the similarity in patterns of maze description type produced in text-chat and
spoken versions of the task (see, e.g., Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty,
1994; Healey, 1997). Nonetheless, only further work can determine whether this is a seri-
ous problem.
The ideal response would be to extend the techniques used by DiET to spoken interac-
tion to test whether the same results are obtained. However, there is a practical difficulty.
The experiments require that what has been said is recognized before an intervention is
triggered. For example, the spoken target “Okay” is recognized before substituting it for
a spoof “Ummm.” This introduces a delay that significantly disrupts the dynamics of live
spoken or non-verbal interaction but is compatible with the feedback cycles typical of
text-based interaction.
Another general methodological concern is the use of task-oriented dialogues instead
of the naturally occurring conversation data favored by conversation analysis. This is not
an intrinsic limitation of the DiET method which can equally well be used in unstructured
text interactions. The particular value of using task-oriented dialogues here is that it
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provides a relatively well-understood, independent measure of semantic coordination.
Comparable measures are not currently available for natural dialogue.
This leads to the critical question of whether the present findings generalize to other
tasks and situations. The Running Repairs Hypothesis makes a general claim about the
primary mechanisms that coordinate language processing in dialogue and it is a large step
to generalize from the present experimental results to processes of language coordination
in general. Some convergent support comes from prior work that shows that patterns of
(spoken) repair are closely correlated with semantic coordination in the Maze Task (Hea-
ley, 1997) and that interfering with the resources available for identifying and resolving
communication problems systematically alters semantic coordination in both a spoken
version of the Maze task and in graphically mediated interactions (Healey, 2008; Healey,
Swoboda, Umata, & King (2007).
There is also good case for testing these ideas in a wider range of tasks and situations.
The mechanisms of clarification and repair appear to be a ubiquitous and universal fea-
ture of natural dialogue (Colman & Healey, 2011; Dingemanse et al., 2013; Kendrick,
2015; Schegloff, 2007) and for this reason alone should attract much more attention in
experimental and theoretical psycholinguistics. This study provides an additional reason
for giving repair a primary role in explaining coordinated language processing in
dialogue.
If misunderstandings and the repairs that follow them are an important driver of semantic
change, this has a significant corollary: It makes this form of language change a constitu-
tively joint, interactional process. Sequences of clarification and repair only happen when
different people’s language processing capabilities come into contact and mismatches
between them are exposed. This also entail that the local patterns of language change that
result from these joint processes are specific to the particular people and the particular diffi-
culties they actually encounter in the process of coordinating on a particular task. If correct,
this points to a limitation in “globalist” approaches to modeling language, used in Machine
Learning and other forms of statistical modeling which idealize away from individual differ-
ences and the adaptive processes people use in dealing with them. These local processes
may well turn out to be a key advantage of natural languages by enabling flexible and cre-
ative adaptation to new people, new situations, and new tasks.
8. Conclusions
Positive and negative evidence of understanding appear to play systematically different
roles in people’s ability to converge on particular description schemes in the Maze Task. In
particular, while Attenuation of positive evidence has no significant effect, Amplification of
negative evidence promotes convergence on systematic, abstract ways of describing maze
locations. The processes involved in detecting and repairing misunderstandings do more
than keep the conversation afloat (Schegloff, 1992), they have systematic effects on subse-
quent language use by driving changes in the speed and form of semantic coordination that
emerges. This provides support for the Running Repairs Hypothesis: Coordination of
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language use depends first and foremost on processes used to deal with misunderstanding
on the fly. The implication is that language processing in dialogue involves mechanisms
that are qualitatively different from those needed for individual language processing. This
also suggests an opportunity for developing new conceptual and empirical connections
between Conversation Analysis, Psycholinguistics, and Formal Semantics.
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Notes
1. It is important to note that within each description type as described here, there is
significant fine-grained variation. For example, in Matrix schemes, there is variation
in the choice of origin (0 or 1) which sides form the axes, use of letters, or num-
bers for each axis, etc.
2. Though see Clark and Brennan (1991) for an early discussion of how different
media place different constraints on grounding and repair.
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